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HAWALA: THE TERRORIST'S INFORMAL FINANCIAL 
MECHANISM 
Robert Loonev 
Dr. Looney is a professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, 
Naval Postgraduate School. 
S ince 9/ 11, investigations into the al-Qaeda financial network have led to several notable successes in the United States and Europe. 
Much of this achievement in the United 
States has resulted from strengthening the 
financial investigatory powers of domestic 
law-enforcement agencies and coordinating 
them through the Treasury Department's 
new Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking 
Center. In other countries, the Paris-based 
Financial Action Task Force, for example, 
is helping to coordinate the tracking of 
terrorist funds through the global banking 
system and cracking down on countries 
that fail to improve transparency and 
regulation. These efforts are already 
proving useful in uncovering large-scale 
drug-trafficking and money-laundering 
operations. They have also helped reveal 
important information on terrorist groups, 
particularly those operating in the West. 
Financial investigators tracking al-
Qaeda assets rely heavily on data and 
paper trails from commercial banks and 
financial regulators in pursuing and investi-
gating leads. Such data have involved the 
tracing of wire transfers between sus-
pected hijacker Mohammed Atta and 
Shaykh Said of Dubai, believed to be one 
of Osama bin Laden's key financial 
operatives. Unfortunately, these efforts 
have achieved little success to date in 
reaching the core of the al-Qaeda financial 
network. The problem is that many of the 
organization's funding mechanisms - like 
its cells - are small and inconspicuous, 
often using a traditional Muslim method of 
money exchange called hawala. 
WORKINGS OF THE SYSTEM 
The word "hawala" means "transfer" 
in Arabic. In some contexts, the word 
"hawala" is used synonymously with 
"trust," usually to express the personal 
connection between participants and the 
informal nature of transactions that are not 
formally documented. 
In essence, hawala is a transfer or 
remittance from one party to another, 
without use of a formal financial institution 
such as a bank or money exchange and is, 
in this sense, an "informal" transaction. 
There are several other common aspects 
to hawala. First, in most cases, hawala 
transactions go across international lines, 
such as with worker remittances to their 
home countries. Second, hawala usually 
involves more than one currency, although, 
again, this is not absolutely required. Third, 
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a hawala transaction usually entails princi-
pals and intermediaries. To accommodate 
requests of the principals, the intermediar-
ies usually take financial positions. Later, 
much as in the case of conventional 
banking practices, these transactions will 
be cleared among the units to balance their 
books. 
A typical transaction often involves an 
expatriate remittance. For example, an 
expatriate Pakistani worker in the UAE 
wishes to send money back home. To do 
this he goes to an intermediary, the 
hawaladar, to arrange the transfer. He 
makes payment in dollars or other convert-
ible currency. The hawaladar in the UAE 
contacts a counterpart in Pakistan, who 
makes payment in rupees to the remitter's 
family or other beneficiary. Obviously, 
some network of family or connections 
among hawaladars is required to make 
such a system work on a large-scale and 
ongoing basis. 
It is important to note that, although the 
remitter in this case wished money to be 
sent to a distinct location, no money 
actually crossed the border physically and 
no money necessarily entered the conven-
tional or official banking system (unless of 
course the Pakistani recipient decided to 
place it there). The transaction rests upon 
a single communication between 
hawaladars and is often not recorded or 
guaranteed by a written contract. The 
trust between the two hawaladars secures 
the debt and allow:-. the debt to stand with 
no legal means of reclamation. There is an 
implicit guarantee on payments, however, 
because a broken trust would result in 
community ostracism constituting economic 
suicide for the hawaladar. 1 
Typically, poorer individuals use the 
hawala system to take advantage of its low 
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cost and fast delivery. For the blue-collar 
worker who transfers a monthly stipend of 
$100, the unofficial hawala is a far cheaper 
way to send money back home than the 
official banking system, at a rate of around 
1 percent of the amount transferred. 
Because of its low overhead costs, hawala 
provides a more favorable market ex-
change rate than the official one. In short, 
the economic attraction of hawala to the 
customer is usually the speed, low cost and 
reliability of the system compared to the 
use of established financial institutions: 
banks, money exchanges, Western Union, 
Money Gram and other providers of this 
service. 
The system is ideal for use in isolated 
localities like the tribal areas of Pakistan 
and Afghanistan, where formal financial 
institutions are rare. 
EXTENT OF THE SYSTEM 
Hawala agents work in a range of 
settings, from curbside stalls and modest 
offices in South Asia to back rooms and 
secret locations in Europe and North 
America. The only limits to the size of a 
transaction are the willingness of the 
sender to carry cash and the capacity of 
the receiving agent to cover the transac-
tion. Exchanges in the tens of thousands 
of dollars are frequent. 
Although Pakistan, India and the 
Persian Gulf states are home to the largest 
concentration of haw ala organizations, 
Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, 
perhaps handles the largest volume of 
transactions. The system has global reach. 
Investigators believe hawala organizations 
exist throughout the United States and 
Europe. 
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Estimates abound, however.2 Pakistani 
officials estimate that more than $5 billion 
enters the country through hawala net-
works every year, making the system the 
country's largest source of hard currency. 
One third of that reportedly consists of the 
repatriation of funds from expatriate 
Pakistanis to their families. Pakistani 
nationals may hold between $40 billion and 
S60 billion in overseas financial assets, an 
amount roughly equivalent to the country's 
gross domestic product. 
In the case of India, Interpol places the 
size of hawala at possibly 40 percent of the 
country's gross domestic product. In 1998 
(the latest figures available) estimates 
place the amount of money in the country's 
system at S680 billion, roughly the size of 
Canada's entire economy.' 
In summary, the hawala system, 
especially in South Asia, is extensive, 
extremely liquid and a rational choice for 
poorer segments of the population. While 
seeming a bit mysterious to outsiders, the 
hawala is comparable in mechanics and 
economic structure to most other remit-
tance alternatives, including those that run 
through licensed channels. The most 
obvious "legal" problem with hawala in 
remitting countries is the lack of any 
registration or licensing, although the 
operations themselves are generally 
harmless. In receiving countries like India, 
there is in addition the more subtle potential 
clash between hawala operation and 
exchange controls. Hawala transactions 
often result in increased black-market 
transactions and expanded underground 
activity. The fact is, though, that hawala is 
essentially an economic phenomenon. It 
would remain so e\en if there were no 
terrorist international transfers, drug trade 
or money laundering. 
Although the great bulk of hawala 
transactions are as harmless as the remit-
tance example noted above, the system has 
proved to be extremely useful for money 
laundering and masking the intricate 
financial operations required by terrorists, 
drug dealers and other criminal elements. 
Given its size and semi-legitimate status in 
South Asia, it is not hard for terrorists to 
transfer money using the hawala channel. 
They are labyrinths replete with pseud-
onyms, middlemen and dead ends. 
Wealthy Arab patrons in the Middle East 
likely send funds to al-Qaeda through 
hawala organizations, as do myriad Arab 
charities acting as fund-raising fronts. The 
smaller the value of the transfer, the less 
attention it is likely to attract, but it is still 
easy to transfer large amounts of money 
without raising questions. 
THWARTING TERRORISTS 
In the war on terrorism, a major 
challenge will be to infiltrate and monitor 
hawala networks in the Middle East. A 
crackdown by Arab and South Asian 
governments at the behest of Western 
governments is simply not feasible. The 
vast majority of the money is from legal, 
legitimate sources, and the hawala organi-
zations are numerous and extremely 
powerful. 
Arab and South Asian governments 
have neither the effective means nor the 
will to closely monitor each transaction in 
these organizations. In any case, methods 
of this sort would most likely prove ineffec-
tive. As an amorphous collection of 
independent operators, hawalas do not 
depend on a single location or infrastruc-
ture. A crackdown would simply drive 
them underground. Because many citizens 
in these countries would view actions of this 
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sort as caving in to Western demands at the 
expense of Muslim tradition, it could also 
create a backlash against the governments. 
Instead, what may need to be done is 
to see how hawalas can be licensed and/or 
registered so that they will continue to 
serve those who need the service while, at 
the same time, not become abused by 
money launderers and criminals. 
Along these lines, participants at a 
conference in Abu Dhabi held on May 16, 
2002, recommended the setting up of 
control systems to monitor hawalas with 
sufficient documentation about the 
remitters and recipients, to guard against 
any diversion of funds into illegal or 
criminal activities. They also called for 
government licensing and regulation of 
hawala offices in the same way as insur-
ance offices are regulated. 
For its part, Pakistan is establishing a 
Special Investigation Group (SIG) in the 
Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to 
counter terrorism. This group could help 
enforce hawala regulations. In addition, 
crime wings of the FIA would help the SIG 
investigate cash flows to and from sus-
pected groups and individuals through 
illegal monetary transactions such as 
hawala. 
I flicensing, registration or normal 
police work4 is ineffective in stopping the 
abuse of the hawala systems by terrorists, 
an economic approach should be consid-
ered. If the desire of the authorities is to 
constrain or significantly reduce the 
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importance of hawala activity, this means 
reducing the economic incentives to do 
hawala. There is probably no better way 
to accomplish this than to facilitate cheap, 
fast remittances across international 
borders, and to do away with dual and 
parallel exchange markets, which are 
always an incentive to keep transactions 
underground. 
If those countries had reasonably 
expedient, well-regulated and user-friendly 
banks, then the hawala system would not 
have flourished and would not have been 
abused by terrorists and criminal elements. 
In this regard, there have been some 
encouraging signs. Several exchange 
companies in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and 
the Gulf countries have now adopted the 
door-to-door delivery of money in a 
manner similar to one that the Philippine 
banks have successfully introduced and 
implemented to stave off the unofficial 
market operators. The more innovative 
institutions in India are now using low-cost 
couriers to deliver door-to-door service. 
This compensates for the lack of presence 
of banks in different parts of the country. 
The smaller and more numerous exchange 
companies are also competing today with 
the hawala system in speed, efficiency of 
execution, settlement and delivery of 
money and services. 
These factors may bring down a 
hawala system that has been prone to 
errors, fraud and abuse by unscrupulous 
groups. 
1 Patrick Jost of the Department of the Treasury, "'The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and Its Role in 
Money Laundering," Interpol, October 2, 2002, http://www.interpol.int/public/financialcrime/ 
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2 Ibid. 
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